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Restructuring a Democracy: An
Analysis of the New Proposed
Constitution for Israel
The constitution of a state is stable and permanent, not to be worked
upon by the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of
events: notwithstanding the competition of opposing interests and the
violence of contending parties, it remains firm and immovable, as a
mountain amidst the strife of storms, or a rock in the ocean amidst the
raging of the waves. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 309
(1795).
Introduction*
Israel has neither a written constitution' nor an entrenched bill of
* The following abbreviations are used in this Note:
L.S.I. -Laws of the State of Israel
P.D. -Piskei Din (Hebrew) (Law reports of the Supreme Court, published by Ministry
of Justice)
P.E. -Psakim 'Elyon (Hebrew) (Supreme Court law reports published by Israel Bar
Association, 1949- )
S.H. -Sefer Hahukim (Hebrew) (Laws of the Knesset)
S.J. -Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel (1948-58)
Glossary:
Hapraklit -Law Journal now published by the Israeli Bar Association in cooperation
with the faculty of Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Iyunei Mishpat -Tel Aviv University Law Review
Mishpatim -Hebrew University, Jerusalem Law Review
I. Constitutions may be defined broadly or narrowly. Unwritten constitutions
are often broadly defined as "flexible," whereas written constitutions are often nar-
rowly defined as "rigid" or "formal." See Munro, What is a Constitution?, 1983 PUB. L.
563. Israel lacks a constitution in the narrower sense because it does not have a
written constitution: "A written constitution is normally thought and spoken of as a
curb upon the supremacy of the legislature; and a constitution under which the legis-
lature is supreme is normally called 'unwritten'." Diplock, On the Unwritten Constitu-
tion, 9 ISRAEL L. REV. 463 (1974).
Some commentators characterize Israel's Basic Laws as a multi-documentary con-
stitution. See, e.g., H. VAN MAARSEVEEN & G. VAN DER TANG, WRrrrEN CONSTrru-
TIONS 41 (1978). Others view the Basic Laws as a hybrid form of constitution:
The Israel [sic] constitution has been described as an "emerging constitu-
tion." Since, however, the accepted use and definition of the word "constitu-
tion" includes constitutions based on unwritten rules and embraces the
norms embodied in ordinary laws prescribing constitutional principles, I
would say, with all due respect, that the expression "emerging constitution"
lacks precision. Israel already has a constitution possessing components of
22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 115 (1989)
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rights. 2 In August of 1987, four professors at the University of Tel Aviv
Law School3 ("Reichman Group") released a draft constitution for the
State of Israel.4 The seventeen-chapter document contains a bill of
rights, and it details the powers and duties of the government, the Knes-
set, 5 the judicial system, the public administration, the Israeli Defense
Forces, and the political parties.
An ambitious effort that has received notable support,6 the pro-
posed draft merits special attention for several reasons. First, the pro-
posal offers a broad treatment of issues and a crystallization of principles
more ambitious than any prior effort. 7 Second, the proposal comes at a
the mentioned above categories. It has further been said that the constitu-
tion of Israel is unwritten....
... The constitutional rules of Israel are included in Basic Laws .... in
ordinary laws including constitutional provisions, in abstract legal norms and
in customs and practices. In other words, the Israel [sic] constitution is best
described as partly written and partly unwritten although there are as yet
almost no legal norms of special preferential status from the legislative point
of view.
Shamgar, On the Written Constitution, 9 ISRAEL L. REv. 467, 469 (1974).
2. An entrenched law is one that a governing body may repeal or amend only in
accordance with a special procedure. Such laws provide a basis for judicial review.
On forms of entrenchment, see J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS 159-72
(1980).
3. The Professors are University of Tel Aviv Law School Dean Uriel Reichman,
Baruch Bracha, Ariel Rosen-Zvi, and Amos Shapira. Other Israeli and foreign schol-
ars participated as well.
4. See Hatza'at Chuka Lemedinat Yisrael (Proposed Constitution for the State of
Israel) [hereinafter Proposed Constitution].
5. Under the Transition Law, 5709-1949, 3 L.S.I. 3 (1949), the Israeli legislature
became known as "the Knesset" and the Constituent Assembly as "the First Knes-
set." H.E. BAKER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 10 (1968). Without a constitution,
the Knesset's legislative powers are unrestricted. Id. at 11.
6. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir "congratulated [the drafters] on their
.positive initiative' and said that he would support their efforts to get their proposal
accepted." Shaley, No Doubt About Needfor Constitution, Shamir Tells Surprised TAU Profs,
Jerusalem Post, Oct. 9, 1987. Israeli President Hayim Herzog in his address to the
Nation similarly emphasized the country's need for a constitution:
Indeed, this is the time to hold a thorough, nonpolitical national discussion,
to be based on a new national consent, on the issue of formulation of a Con-
stitution for Israel. A Constitution which will anchor the fundamentals of
living in the State and will strengthen Israel's Democracy, a Constitution
which will mirror our qualities of unity and uniqueness as a nation, which will
be based on the Declaration of Independence as well as on the realities of life
in Israel after forty years of sovereignty.
Address to the Nation on the Eve of Rosh Hashana, 5748, by President Hayim
Herzog.
Notwithstanding these broad accolades, by its terms the proposed constitution will
be enacted only if it receives a vote of two-thirds of the Knesset, as well as a majority
of votes in a public referendum. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § Q(204)(a).
Although it is odd that the draft's own terms would dictate its adoption, no other
standards seem to exist. In addition, the draft constitution's provisions set forth a
more rigorous threshold than that necessary for the adoption of Basic Laws.
7. See Maariv, Aug. 12, 1987, at 10 (Hebrew).
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time when Israel's frustration with its political system has peaked.8
Cries for reform are no longer limited to a few extremists in Don-Quix-
otic publications; today, Knesset members and mainstream academics
alike champion change.9
Third, the drafters of the constitution propose to resolve recurrent
Israeli concerns through unique and innovative provisions. Finally, the
proposal has received a surprising amount of public attention and sup-
port, jolting the collective Israeli conscience and exciting popular imagi-
nation more than any previous constitutional effort.' 0
Two aspects of the proposed constitution are particularly contro-
versial. First, the proposed draft addresses the government-religion
relationship in a bill of rights. The bill of rights attempts to balance
Israel's Jewish character with the interests of the country's secular
majority. Israel's religious community strongly opposes the draft, fear-
ful of a diminution of Israel's Jewish character. 1 Others simply believe
the constitution's language is too ambiguous to serve as an effective
legal guideline.1 2
A second area of particular controversy is the proposed overhaul of
Israel's political structure. The proposal would require relatively small
parties with similar views to combine, while ensuring the existence of
religious parties, including an Arab party. Some critics fear the effect
such change would have on party politics; the smaller religious parties
would lose much of their bargaining power in forming coalitions.
Others fear that the proposed changes in the electoral system would
make it easier for a "strongman" to take control of the government.' 3
Implementation of these two proposals would affect profoundly the
religious and political life of every Israeli citizen. Regardless of their
ultimate disposal, however, the proposed changes have independent sig-
nificance as legal, cultural, and political ideas. From all perspectives, the
draft proposals are sure to draw the eyes of the world.
This Note surveys the two sections of the proposed constitution
addressing the government-religion relationship and political organiza-
tion. Section I traces the historical progression of Israel's quest for a
constitution. Section II focuses on religion and the Israeli state both
8. Indeed, Professor Reichman feels that "[t]he political system has ceased to
function." Krivine, Concerned Scholars Create a Constitution for Israel Including Electoral
Reform,Jerusalem Post, Aug. 10, 1987. See also The Political System in Israel, Sugges-
tions for Change 1 (B. Susser, experimental ed. 1987) (unpublished manuscript)
(Hebrew) [hereinafter Suggestions].
9. Suggestions, supra note 8.
10. Interview with Uriel Reichman, Chairman of Constitutional Committee, in
New York City (Oct. 5, 1987). Professor Reichman cites educating the public as the
first step in the battle for a constitution. OnJan. 13, 1988, Maariv, one of Israel's two
mass-circulation daily newspapers, reprinted a copy of the constitution.
11. Maariv, Jan. 14, 1988, at 6, col. 1 (Hebrew).
12. Interview with Rudolph Dolzer, visiting Professor, Cornell Law School, in Ith-
aca, New York (Nov. 18, 1987). Professor Dolzer, a member of the Max Planck Insti-
tute, participated in the discussions on the proposed Israeli constitution.
13. See infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
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from an historical perspective and from the standpoint of the proposed
constitution. Section III then analyzes Israel's current political and elec-
toral systems, and the likely impact of the proposed constitution.
Finally, this Note concludes that, after forty years of postponement and
inertia, Israel is ready for a written constitution.
I. Israel's "Creeping Constitutionalism": Historical Origins
Although upon its fortieth year of independence, Israel still struggles to
develop its constitutional principles. In the state's early years, its lead-
ers heatedly debated the need for a formal constitution. There were
even efforts to draft a constitution. The result, however, was "the great
Israeli compromise: creeping constitutionalism."' 4
A. The Establishment of the State of Israel and the Promise of a
Constitution
On May 14, 1948, "Members of the People's Council, representatives of
the Jewish Community of Eretz Israel and of the Zionist Movement"
established the Jewish State in the Declaration of Independence. 15 The
Declaration begins with an historical-ideological introduction, empha-
sizing the link between the Jewish people and the land of Israel. 16 The
Declaration then establishes a Provisional Council of State and the Pro-
visional Government, and it mandates the later establishment of elected,
regular authorities of the State "in accordance with the Constitution
which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later
than the 1st October 1948 .... ,,17
B. The Initial Enthusiasm Wanes
The Provisional Council of State appointed a Constitution Committee
on July 8, 1948.18 The Council discussed issues which were to plague
Israel for the next forty years, particularly the role ofJudaism in the new
state. 19
When the First Knesset created a Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee in April, 1949, it appeared that the new body would con-
tinue the Constitution Committee's efforts. Soon, however, a new polit-
14. See Lehman-Wilzig, Political Reform in Israel-Lessons from the American Experience,
in Suggestions, supra note 8, at 65.
15. Declaration of Independence, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948), reprinted in Shapira,Judicial
Review Without a Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 405 (1983). For a
summary of the Declaration's constitutional content, see Y. FREUDENHEIM, GOVERN-
MENT IN ISRAEL 7 (1967).
16. Shapira, supra note 15, at 405.
17. 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948).
18. Y. FREUDENHEIM, supra note 15, at 8. For a discussion of the Provisional
Council's consideration of a written constitution before and after Israel acquired
independence, see Klein, A New Era in Israel's Constitutional Law, 6 ISRAEL L. REV. 376,
377 (1971).
19. See Y. FREUDENHEIM, supra note 15, at 8. For further discussion of the group's
deliberations, see id. at 18-24.
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ical picture emerged, prompting a divisive debate both in committee
and in plenary debates. Proponents of a written constitution viewed it
as a symbol of sovereign independence and national unity. They
emphasized the importance of normative superiority and constitutional
entrenchment in the new state's early years. 20
Opponents effectively advocated the postponement of an adoption
of a constitution. 2 1 First, they argued that the Israeli society was an
evolving young community awaiting the gathering of Diaspora Jews.
Opponents felt that a formalized constitution would freeze the dyna-
mism of the evolving state, ignoring potential creative contributions of
the many expected immigrants. 22 Second, opponents worried that a
constitution drafted in the midst of the nation's struggle for survival
would give the government emergency powers that could impinge upon
individual freedoms. 23 Third, proponents and opponents of a constitu-
tion bitterly divided on the role religion was to play in the new state.
Absent a national consensus, critics argued, a rigid constitution could
not enmesh religion and state.24 A fourth argument, stemming from the
English tradition of an unwritten constitution and parliamentary
supremacy, viewed a written constitution as anachronistic. 2 5 Finally,
many politicians opposed a written constitution, fearing that it would
impede the efficient functioning of the government.2 6
Instead of adopting a formal constitution, the Knesset ultimately
passed the famous compromise "Harari Resolution" of June 13, 1950,
which provided:
The First Knesset commissions the Committee on Constitution, Law, and
Justice, to prepare a proposed constitution for the state. The constitution
shall be constructed in chapters in such a way that each one of them shall
be a fundamental law by itself. The chapters shall be brought before the
Knesset as the committee finishes its work on each, and all the chapters
together shall then be combined into a constitution for the state.2 7
Although the resolution affirmed Israel's need for a written constitution,
20. Shapira, supra note 15, at 408-09. See also S. SAGER, THE PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 37 (1985).
21. Shapira, supra note 15, at 409-10. See also S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 37-39.
22. Discounting the need for a written constitution, Israeli statesman David Ben-
Gurion predicted before the Knesset in 1949 that the nation's population would
double in four years. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 36. Underlying the arguments
raised to justify postponement of constitutional adoption, however, lurked the "natu-
ral interest of the dominant party in the coalition of preserving for itself the largest
measure of unhampered freedom to govern." Id. at 38.
23. Shapira, supra note 15, at 409.
24. Id. See also Y. FREUDENHEIM, supra note 15, at 34-36.
25. Shapira, supra note 15, at 410.
26. Shapira, supra note 15, at 408.
27. 5 Knesset Protocols 1743 (1950). The declaration contained four sections: a
statement of purpose; directions on how to prepare a constitution; directions on how
to bring it before the Knesset; and a conclusive restatement of purpose. See Shamgar,
Legislation, Justice and Citizen's Rights, 37 HAPRAKLIT 5 (1986) (Hebrew).
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it nonetheless formally postponed the adoption of one.2 8 The Knesset
has never clearly elucidated the notion of "chapters," i.e., the distinction
between Basic Laws promulgated under the resolution's directive and
ordinary legislation. Some commentators have argued that the Knesset
intends Basic Laws to be superior to other laws.29 "Thus a Basic Law is
really a Constitutional Law and part of a potential constitution. ' 3 0
The Harari Resolution also fails to specify procedures and dead-
lines for adopting Basic Laws.3 1 It is unclear whether the Knesset
intended that Basic Laws stand superior to ordinary laws and therefore
whether more than a mere Knesset majority is necessary to amend Basic
Laws.3 2 An entrenched law is one that only a law enacted by a special
procedure can repeal or amend, and courts will invalidate statutes which
are inconsistent with entrenched provisions. 33 Although two Basic Laws
include entrenched clauses,3 4 the resolution does not address whether a
non-entrenched clause in a Basic Law is superior to ordinary legisla-
tion.3 5 Uncertainty stems from two factors: first, the absence of a
repugnance clause specifying that no law is to be inconsistent with the
Basic Law; and second, the Knesset's knowing enactment of provisions
inconsistent with Basic Laws.3 6
28. Note, Adjudication of Freedom of Expression Cases Under Israel's Unwritten Constitu-
tion, 18 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 247, 251 (1985). See also E. RACKMAN, ISRAEL'S EMERGING
CONSTITUTION: 1948-1951 118 (1955).
29. See Rubinstein, Israel's Piecemeal Constitution, 16 SCRIPTA HIEROSOLYMITANA
201, at 206 (1966). Commentators have raised two objections to the view that Basic
Laws are superior to ordinary legislation. First, "the Knesset Law, 'for all its official
designation as Basic Law has no higher validity than any subsequent statute, and it
will be the provision of the lex posterior, that will prevail.'" Id. at 208, citing B.
AKZIN, INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS CONVENTION IN ISRAEL, JERUSALEM 161, 190 (1959).
Second, since an ordinary Knesset majority enacts Basic Laws, it is illogical that only
a special majority could alter them. Professor Rubinstein believes that even an ordi-
nary majority would suffice to enact a constitution. Id. at 208-09.
30. Klein, supra note 18, at 391. A group of different parts, such as "Basic Laws,"
can compose a constitution. Klein cites as an example France's Third Republic(1875-1940), which was based upon several "lois constitutionnelles" adopted at different
times.
Professor Rubinstein has argued that an act designated by the Knesset as a "Basic
Law" is a higher, or constitutional, law superior to ordinary legislative acts. Rubin-
stein's theory stems from an historical analysis of the source of Knesset powers.
Rubinstein, supra note 29, at 202-05. According to Rubinstein, "a Basic Law passed
in accordance with the 1950 resolution indicates, together with other constitutional
features found in the law itself, that it is part of the constitution." Id. at 206. For
further discussion of this thesis, see Nimmer, The Uses ofJudicial Review in Israel's Quest
for a Constitution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1217, 1238-40 (1970).
31. Shapira, supra note 15, at 410.
32. Rubinstein, supra note 29, at 208-09. See also Shapira, supra note 15, at 412.
33. On forms of entrenchment, see J. JACONELLI, supra note 2.
34. Basic Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1958), provides, inter alia, that only an
absolute majority of the Knesset can change the electoral system and that emergency
regulations may not affect the law absent a two-thirds majority. Basic Law: The Gov-
ernment, 22 L.S.I. 257 (1968), stipulates that only an absolute majority can alter
emergency regulations. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 40-41.
35. Rubinstein, supra note 29, at 211.
36. Rubinstein, supra note 29, at 211.
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The Knesset has adopted eight Basic Laws on various issues,3 7 yet it
has failed to enact one that covers either human rights or legislation.
Israel clearly has failed to create a constitution by installments, since
"the installments are simply not forthcoming. ' 38 If adopted, a written
constitution would clear the uncertainty surrounding the status of Basic
Laws and place Israel's constitutional law on firm ground.3 9
The Reichman Group's draft represents the most comprehensive
effort yet toward a formal, written Israeli constitution. It is beyond the
scope of this Note to discuss every innovation and every refinement the
draft offers.40 This Note therefore focuses on the two most analytically
challenging portions of the proposal: religion and state and the political
reform.
II. Religion and State-The Israeli Experience
A. Basic Tenets-A Home for the Jewish People
The Reichman Group proposal makes clear that it intends to preserve
the Jewish character of the Israeli state. The proposal begins with a
statement of the Israeli constitution's Basic Tenets: "The State of Israel
is the state of the Jewish People, founded on this People's eternal right
to sovereign existence in Eretz (The Land of) Israel." 4 1
Some commentators object to including the notion of a Jewish state
in an Israeli constitution.4 2 They argue that for the first time in the his-
tory of nations in general, and of Israel in particular, a law declares that
the state belongs to a people that mostly resides elsewhere. 43 Israel,
critics argue, is not then the state of its citizens, but of the amorphous
"Jewish People." 44
Professor Reichman responds to this objection by noting that the
Basic Tenets also provide that "[t]he State of Israel is a democratic
state." 4 5 In a democratic state, according to Reichman, the rulers are
the citizens. 46 As the proposal further notes, "The source of all govern-
37. See, e.g., Basic Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1958); Basic Law: Israel
Lands, 14 L.S.I. 48 (1960); Basic Law: The President of the State, 18 L.S.I. 111
(1964); Basic Law: The Government, 22 L.S.I. 257 (1968); Basic Law: The State
Economy, 29 L.S.I. 273 (1975); Basic Law: The Army, 30 L.S.I. 150 (1976); Basic
Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 L.S.I. 209 (1980); Basic Law: Adjudication,
1110 S.H. 78 (1984).
38. Rubinstein, supra note 29, at 207.
39. Rubinstein, supra note 29, at 216.
40. Sections that may be of interest but which this Note does not discuss include
changes concerning Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, §§ F (Legislation), G (Trea-
ties), I (Judicature), and L (Economy).
41. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § A-Basic Tenets.
42. See, e.g., Michael, The Proposed Constitution and the Mockery, Chadashot, Aug. 14,
1987 (Hebrew).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Reichman, You Did Not Read the Fine Print, Chadashot, Aug. 21, 1987
(Hebrew).
46. Id.
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mental authority is the will of the citizens."' 47 These "citizens" include
non-Jews, as the following clause indicates: "Human dignity, and the
full civil and political equality of all citizens, regardless of origin, reli-
gion, race, sex, or ethnic affiliation (le'om) underline the foundation of
the state of Israel." 48 Based on this language, Reichman concludes that
the state belongs to its citizens, including Israel's Arabs.4 9
Israel was founded on a distinct cultural-historical background.
The Declaration of Independence itself proclaims that Israel is a Jewish
state, and ignoring this basic notion of statehood is to ignore Israel's
past, present, and hopes for the future.50 The basic question that has
perplexed Israelis for over forty years is whether a secular state can have
a significantly religious legal order while maintaining a pluralistic soci-
ety.51 The proposed draft attempts to resolve this basic dilemma by dis-
tinguishing purely religious from national values.
B. Historical Efforts to Secure Religious Freedom
Great Britain governed Palestine under a United Nations mandate from
the end of World War I until May 5, 1948.52 Article 83 of the British-
enacted Palestine Order in Council, 1922, 53 secures freedom of religion
in Israel.54 It states that "[a]ll persons in Palestine shall enjoy full lib-
erty of conscience, and the free exercise of their forms of worship, sub-
ject only to the maintenance of public order and morals."15 5 This
provision still has legal effect in Israel and is binding on the executive.
It is not, however, superior to Knesset legislation.5 6
Israel's Declaration of Independence also speaks to religious
equality:
The State of Israel . . . will be based on freedom, justice, and peace as
envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will endure complete equality of
social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race
or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, educa-
47. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § A.
48. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § A.
49. Reichman, supra note 45.
50. Reichman, supra note 45. ("The term 'The State of the Jewish People' has a
deep historical, cultural and symbolic meaning."). Some say that without such a
clause the constitution could belong to any state in the world. In the Mafdal[Religious
Parties] Willingness to Consider the Proposed Constitution Prepared at Tel Aviv Univ.,
Chadashot, Aug. 9, 1987 (Hebrew).
51. See E. RACICMAN, supra note 28, at 120.
52. Concerning Palestine's general legislative scheme during the British Mandate
and its impact on the Israeli state, see Nimmer, supra note 30, at 1246-52.
53. 3 Laws of Palestine 2738 (1922). See Leon v. Acting Dist. Comm'r, 1 S.J. 41,
50 (1948) (referring to Palestine Order in Council of 1922 as "the basic constitution
of Palestine") (Hebrew).
54. Rubinstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 380, 401 (1967).
Although typically used to connote the right to practice one's religious beliefs, the
phrase "freedom of religion" also encompasses freedom from religion, that is, the
right not to observe any religious laws at all. Id.
55. 3 Laws of Palestine 2738 (1922).
56. Rubinstein, supra note 54, at 401.
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tion and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions. 57
The Declaration of Independence lacks constitutional force and does
not represent a legal norm.5 8 Nevertheless, it does articulate the "credo
and vision of the People."'5 9 Israeli courts therefore resort to the Decla-
ration only when confronted with ambiguous legislative intent. In such
cases, courts prefer the construction extending the greatest protection
to individual freedom. 60
Despite a strong awareness of human rights concerns, there is no
separation of religion and state in Israel.6 1 The dream of a national-
secular Jewish state at one time guided the mainstream of the Zionist
movement towards the establishment of Israel. 6 2 According to this
"secular-Zionist view,"163 the state has the "specific mission" to "consti-
tute the national state of the Jews and to preserve and further Jewish
national culture. Religion is relevant but merely as part of the national
heritage."' 64 Thus, "the peculiar nature ofJudaism, both in its being a
way of life and not merely consisting of religious dogmas and in its inter-
mingling of religious and national elements, is not conducive to any sep-
aration of religion and State." 65
C. Judicial Protection of Secular Interests
Israeli courts often try to protect the secular block from coercive legisla-
tion. The lack of a written constitution, however, allows the legislature
to enact laws overruling these decisions.
57. Declaration of Independence, 1 L.5.I. 3, 4 (1948).
58. H/C 10/48, Ziv v. Gubernik, I P.D. 85 (1948) (Hebrew); Rosen-Zvi, Freedom of
Religion: The Israeli Experience, 46 ZErrERCHRIFT FUR AUsKABDUSCHES OFFENTLICHES
Rzcrr UND VOLKERRECHT 213, 219 (1986); Berenson, Freedom of Religion and Conscience
in the State of Israel, 3 IYUNEI MISHPAT 405 (1973) (Hebrew).
59. Ziv v. Gubemik, 1 P.D. 85.
60. Shetreet, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion: A Dialogue, Some Reflec-
tions on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Israel, 4 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 194, 195
(1974); H.C. 262/62, Perez v. Kfar Shmaryahu Local Council, 16 P.D. 2101 (1962)
(Hebrew) (holding that municipality must rent community halls to non-Orthodox
Jews for religious services). The Perez court states: "Even if the Declaration of Inde-
pendence itself has not conferred rights upon the citizen enforceable by way of legal
action, it provides a pattern of life for citizens of the State and requires every State
authority to be guided by its principles." 16 P.D. at 2116. Courts also have relied on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and the International Covenant on
Political and Civil Rights, 1966, which, although not binding on Israeli courts, reflect
"the basic principles of equality, freedom and justice which are the heritage of all
modern enlightened states." H.C. 301/63, Streit v. Chief Rabbi, 18(l) P.D. 598, 612
(1964) (Hebrew). See also H.C. 132/66, Segev v. Safad Rabbinical Court, 21(2) P.D.
505, 551 (1966) (Hebrew) (referring to Draft Convention for the Prevention of Reli-
gious Intolerance). Israeli courts consider freedom of religion and of conscience to
be basic human rights. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 220.
61. Shetreet, supra note 60, at 205. On ways in which Israel deviates from the
traditional model of freedom from religion, see Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 223-25.
62. Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM.J. COMP. L. 185, 187 (1987).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 205.
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In Israel, conflict often arises in connection with classification and
application of national-religious norms.66 The particular nature of
Judaism, in which national and religious elements overlap, necessitates a
distinction between purely religious norms and norms that display
national features.67 Religious norms generally infringe upon freedom
of conscience and religion. An example of such a norm is the prohibi-
tion against pork production, enforcement of which violates religious
liberty. 68 Positive societal norms, such as a weekly day of rest, are not
religiously coercive.
A legislature imposing these national/societal norms, aiming to for-
malize historical values and its cultural heritage, does not thereby
infringe on religious freedom. 69 Conflict arises in the incidents where
coercive religious laws are passed before they have become positive
societal norms. 70
The legal aspects of most religious coercion issues have centered
around the validity of municipal bylaws. 71 A local or executive authority
may not impose a prohibition based on a religious objective.7 2 Courts
will not permit any entity to use administrative powers or secondary leg-
islation in order to achieve a religious purpose unless the entity has the
authority to do so. 73
Courts have not been sympathetic to the argument of individuals
who claim that witnessing violations of religious laws hurts their reli-
gious feelings. 74 The judiciary, however, will not allow actual interfer-
ence with prayer, and it has upheld laws prohibiting traffic near
synagogues. 75
66. Id. at 215.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 207.
69. Id. at 215.
70. For examples, see id. at 211.
71. Id. at 199.
72. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 220.
73. See, e.g., H.C. 72/55, Fredi v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 10 P.D. 734
(1956) (Hebrew) (invalidating bylaw prohibiting pig-raising and restricting sale of
pork); H.C. 122/54, Aksel v. Mayor of Natanya, 8 P.D. 1524 (1954) (Hebrew) (invali-
dating town's refusal to grant shop license to butcher until he agreed not to sell
pork).
74. See, e.g, H.C. 287/69, Meron v. Minister of Work, 24(1) P.D. 337 (1970)
(Hebrew) (holding petitioner lacked standing to protest grant of Sabbath work per-
mits at television broadcasting company); H.C. 101/70, Rabbi Joshua ZKS v. Mayor
of Petach Tikvah, 24 (1) P.D. 698 (1970) (Hebrew) (holding petitioner lacked stand-
ing to claim entertainment programs on Sabbath offended his religious beliefs as
contrary to collective public interest); H.C. 332/70, Zaltzberg v. City of Ashkelon, 24
(2) P.D. 572 (1970) (Hebrew) (holding petitioner lacked standing to prevent car
race). For a view criticizing Supreme Court disregard for religious sentiment, see
Meron, 24(1) P.D. 337.
75. H.C. 174/62, The League for the Prevention of Religious Coercion v. Jerusa-
lem City Council, 16 (3) P.D. 2665 (1962) (Hebrew) (permitting ordinance closing
streets near synagogue on Sabbath because traffic interfered with prayer. The court
stated that the religious element is permissible because the same would be allowed
Vol. 22
1989 Proposed Israeli Constitution
Despite their willingness to invalidate local laws, Israeli courts hesi-
tate to resolve conflicts between the demands of religious rules of con-
duct and state law. They prefer to apply formal reasons in rejecting
petitions aimed at upsetting the delicate balance arranged by political
bargaining. 76 Nevertheless, Israeli law has found ways to confront situa-
tions of religious coercion which legal and social arguments could not
justify.77
In interpreting laws bearing religious undertones, Israeli jurispru-
dence has at least tacitly accepted the "secular primary-purpose" test.78
According to this test, if a law's primary purpose is secular, 79 then it is
not a coercive norm. In Izramax v. State of Israel,80 for example, Justice
Silberg states that where a religious purpose is not primary to a law and
a secular purpose can justify the provision, it does not infringe upon
religious freedom "even if the statutory provision realizes some reli-
gious purpose in addition." 8 1
D. Sources of Conflict: A Religious Minority Ruling
a Secular Majority
Regarding religions other than Judaism, there exists in Israel, at least
theoretically, absolute religious freedom. 82 There is no formal state
religion, and the Ministry of Religion deals with all religious groupings
in the country and provides them with financial support.8 3 The most
painful problems and discontent in the area of religious liberty in Israel
stem from state imposition of Jewish religious norms on all citizens,
including otherJews, "whether or not they are religiously observant."' 84
This imposition limits freedom from religion. In the area of freedom of
religion, Israeli tolerance does not extend to the Reform and Conserva-
for cultural, commerce or health interests). For a criticism of this decision, see
Rubinstein, supra note 54, at 401 n.65.
76. Englard, supra note 62, at 201. One divisive issue is the exemption of reli-
gious women and students of yeshivot (talmudic schools) from the general duty of
military service.
77. Discussion of these methods is beyond the scope of this Note, but they
include restrictions on secondary legislation and executive acts, ways of interpreta-
tion, and "cooperation" between the legislature and the judiciary. For a detailed
discussion, see Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 238-48.
78. Shetreet, supra note 60, at 214.
79. If a law "is acceptable to enlightened members of society," then it may be
classified as secular. Shetreet, supra note 60, at 214.
80. C.A. 217/68, Izramax v. State of Israel 22(2) P.D. 343 (1968) (Hebrew) (hold-
ing ordinance respecting religious sentiments permissible so long as drafters did not
intend it to serve religious purpose only).
81. Izramax, 22(2) P.D. at 356-58.
82. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 218. Israeli law empowers each religious commu-
nity to establish autonomous religious courts in matters of marriage and divorce.
Tabory, State and Religion: Religious Conflicts Among Jews in Israel, 23 J. CHURCH & ST.
275, 276 (1981). Israeli statutory law is secular, representing all citizens. Likewise,
the state awards the same status to all religions in Israel. Rubinstein, supra note 54, at
400.
83. Tabory, supra note 82, at 276; Rubinstein, supra note 54, at 400.
84. Shetreet, supra note 60, at 207.
Cornell International Law Journal
tive Jewish movements. 85 Reform Jews are allowed to practice their
rituals, but their rabbis cannot perform weddings and the state does not
recognize their officials.8
6
Much religiously coercive legislation is a product of the Israeli polit-
ical framework. Religious groups in Israel traditionally have wielded
disproportionate political power. The religious Zionist block, for exam-
ple, usually participates in Israel's coalition government with the sup-
port of only 12-15 percent of the electorate.8 7 By exerting pressure on
the majority party, religious groups often use the secular political pro-
cess to accomplish religion-oriented legislative goals which the 12-15
percent electoral power would never independently allow.
Even aside from the exigencies of coalition-making, the secularJew-
ish community traditionally has been willing to make concessions to the
religious community.8 8 This willingness stems from "the desire to
establish a Jewish identity for the country and to reach a common
denominator on the basis ofJewish culture together with the difficulty of
finding a secular common denominator."8 9 In addition, most Israelis
observe at least a minimal amount of tradition, contributing to their will-
ingness to compromise. 90
Israel's situation is thus unusual:
The paradox in Israel's situation is that the required protection is that of
the popular majority vis-A-vis the parliamentary majority, and not the pro-
tection of the popular minority against the majority as is generally
85. The rights ofJewish Reform and Conservative denominations are abrogated
in Israel. The government gives these denominations considerably less funding than
it gives the Orthodox community. Tabory, Religious Rights as a Social Problem in Israel,
11 ISRAEL Y.B. oN HUM. RTs. 256, 257-58 (1981). See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at
221.
86. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 221. Other forms of discrimination against
Reform and Conservative Jews include pressures on the Rabbinate to cancel kashrut
certifications for places allowing Reform and Conservative services, and laws
preventing these movements' rabbis from performing state-sanctioned religious
functions. Tabory, supra note 85, at 257.
87. D. PERETZ, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF ISRAEL 112-13 (2d ed. 1983).
In the 1988 elections their support rose to 18 percent. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at
A14, coL 6. See also infra Section III.E. Some say that Labor, the dominant political
party until the rise of the Likud government, relied on the religious parties' support
to stay in power. Tabory, supra note 82, at 279, citing E. BIRNBAUM, THE POLITICS OF
COMPROMISE: STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL 24 (1970). Others say that the Labor
party wanted to keep the religious parties in the coalition to prevent disunity. Id.
citing Don-Yehiya, Religion and Coalition: The National Religious Party and Coalition For-
mation in Israel, in A. ARIAN, THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL (1973).
88. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 217.
89. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 217. Ben-Gurion, in a letter to the newspaper
Davar, wrote that as a result of the Holocaust and of broad-based immigration to
Israel, Israel needed to find a common denominator in following Jewish law in at
least the areas of marriage and divorce. His letter suggests that Israel now revoke
those laws since the rationale for their existence has ceased and the religious parties
have abused the laws. Letter to Davar, Jul. 24, 1970, cited in A. RUBINSTEIN, CONSn-
TLrTIONAL LAw 144-45 (2d ed. 1974) (Hebrew).
90. Tabory, supra note 82, at 281.
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accepted. The majority in essence (the public) stands vis-A-vis the more
formal majority (the political majority in parliament) on the basis of the
claims that a portion of the concessions that are made on behalf of the
religious community are made for improper purposes like political pres-
sures and coalition bargaining and the need to guarantee the ruling
regime at the expense of the majority of the public. 9 1
In Israel, it is the secular majority that most commonly requires protec-
tion from religious dogma imposed by the religious minority.
E. A Bill of Rights for Israel
The drafters of the proposed constitution confronted Israel's historical
religious concerns in section C(22) of the bill of rights. Their task was
particularly difficult given the passion and religious fervor that have pre-.
vented solution of state and religion problems for the last forty years.
The proposed constitution attempts to resolve conflicting interests by
providing freedom of religion and conscience, while permitting certain
exceptions. These exceptions include laws, arguably rooted in Jewish
tradition, which are nonetheless justifiable on secular grounds. The bill
of rights' proposed framework is deliberately somewhat vague in an
effort to gain the support of religious groups. This section discusses the
application of the constitutional provisions regarding religion and state,
as well as the ambiguities associated with these provisions.
1. The General Structure
The structure of section C(22), "Freedom of Religion and Conscience,"
is somewhat ambiguous,9 2 a result of the drafters' efforts to retain the
Jewish character of the state, while maintaining a pluralistic society
based on equality and freedom.9 3 This is not the first time in Israeli
legislative history that such a struggle has emerged. Israel's Declaration
of Independence likewise exemplifies this "ideological ambiguity."9 4
The Declaration on the one hand established a Jewish state based on
freedom, justice and peace, as the Biblical prophets of Israel envisaged.
Simultaneously, it guaranteed freedom of religion and conscience.9 5
This "inherent contradiction" between the Biblical prophets' visions
and "the modern principle of complete equality of all religions" 96 con-
tinues throughout Israel's history, and is evident in the proposed
constitution.
91. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 228.
92. Interview with Bernard Susser, Professor, Bar Ilan University, in Ramat Gan,
Israel (Jan. 12, 1988). Israelis reject the American model of separation of religion
and state for three reasons: (a) the American scheme is too fluid, thereby inviting
judicial manipulation; (b) many Israelis move to the country for religious or cultural
reasons; (c) the United States Constitution rests on liberalism, a concept foreign to
the State of Israel. Interview with Professor Rudolph Dolzer, supra note 12.
93. Interview with Bernard Susser, supra note 92.
94. Englard, supra note 62, at 190.
95. 1 L.S.I., supra note 15, at 3-5.
96. Englard, supra note 62, at 190.
Cornell International Law Journal
The first three subsections of section (22) establish basic princi-
ples, while the fourth creates exceptions that allow the state to maintain
certain customs. Section (22) begins:
(a) Every person is entitled to freedom of religion and conscience.
(b) A person shall not be prejudiced in his occupation on account of
observing the precepts of his religion.
(c) A person shall suffer no deprivation of rights, imposition of obliga-
tions, or enforcement of prohibitions against him on grounds only of
religion.
9 7
The basic rule that emerges includes: "a) the right to the freedom of
religious conscience and b) no coercion, prohibition or negation of
rights" on religious grounds. 98 "In the spirit of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence," 9 9 sections C(22)(a)-(c) promise freedom of religion and of
conscience to all Israelis of all religions. These provisions would revolu-
tionize the existing system by nullifying religiously oppressive laws;
buses would run on the Sabbath, and laws prohibiting movies and other
cultural activities on that day likewise would be unconstitutional.10 0
Subsections C(22)(d)(1)-(5)1 0 1 outline exceptions to the basic prin-
ciple.1 02 Subsection (d)(1) permits the State to support religious institu-
97. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, §§ C(22)(a)-C(22)(c). The drafters rec-
ognize § 22's inherent compromise. Professor Rosen-Zvi, the leading force behind
the section's inclusion, hoped to achieve two goals: (a) the creation of a constitution
compatible with modem tendencies, such as freedom of religion and freedom from
religion, and (b) the creation of a clause which all major political streams can inter-
pret and then accept. Interview with Professor Rudolph Dolzer, supra note 12.
According to Professor Dolzer, the drafters "are trying to square the circle." Id.
98. B. Susser, A Proposed Constitution for Israel, 6-7 (unpublished manuscript).
99. B. Bracha, Constitution Now, Ha'aretz, Aug. 23, 1987, at 72 (Hebrew).
100. Id. Laws prohibiting pig-raising and laws prohibiting the sale of chametz
(leaven) at Passover also would be illegal.
101. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, §§ C(22)(d)(1)-(5) provide:
(d) Nothing in this section shall -
1. preclude the State or public authorities from supporting religious institu-
tions, or from providing religious services or religious education, all on a
basis of equality.
2. preclude recognition of a religious marriage or divorce of the parties'
choice, or affect any provision whereunder a person's choice of any religious
marriage subjects him to the laws of divorce of that religion.
3. affect any provisions given to substantive justification on independent
grounds unconnected with religion.
4. affect the show of consideration for the interests of a religious public and
the need of such a public to maintain its way of life or to fulfill the precepts of
its religion, all on a basis of equality and a proper balance between its inter-
ests and the interests of the rest of the public.
5. affect any provisions pertaining to the ritual fitness (kashrut) of food in
the Israel Defense Army or in public institutions.
102. In the minds of some, subsections (d)(1)-(5) derogate too much from the
principles of freedom of religion so that nothing remains of the original notion.
Interview with Professor Rudolph Dolzer, supra note 12. The Reichman Group and
invited scholars discussing this issue in Eilat in the summer of 1987 concluded that if
Israelis of all sectors are to accept the proposal, there is no alternative to the scheme
drafted. Id.
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tions and to provide religious education "on the basis of equality."' 10 3
In certain instances, the secular majority does support existing arrange-
ments such as the state-funded religious services, management of reli-
gious schools, and certain state-oriented religious ceremonies.10 4
Generally, secular Jews support a very specific type of religious
legislation:
The common denominator that characterizes these matters is that they all
provide a Jewish identity for the State without imposing coercive norms
on the population. Public support for these arrangements can be based
on two alternative arguments: either the arrangement was desirable from
the outset, in recognition of the Jewish identity of the State, or the
arrangement was a compromise in the context of striving for national
unity at a reasonable possible social cost. In these instances, therefore,
there exists an identity between the will of the formal and substantial
majority.1 0 5
The proposal thus tries to separate those issues upon which the secular
majority and the religious minority agree, and to prohibit purely reli-
gious and oppressive legislation.
2. Marriage and Divorce Law
The next subsection, C(22)(d)(2), confronts a current limitation on
Israeli Jews' freedom from official religious dogma. Israelis are subject
to religious law mainly in matters of marriage and divorce. 10 6 The
absence of civil marriage under Israeli municipal laws forces its citizens
to turn to religious ceremonies run by the established religious commu-
nities. 10 7 Israeli Jews particularly suffer, as their majority is secular yet
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of religious tribunals employing reli-
gious laws in matters of procedure and evidence.10 8 In fact, "laws of
marriage are a clear example of the especially severe limitations that are
imposed by religion," 109 and their application is a permanent source of
legal, political and social conflict. 11 0 Responding to modern trends,1 '1
103. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § C(22)(d)(1). This maintains the cur-
rent dual system of public education; parents can choose between giving their chil-
dren a religious state education or a general (secular) state education. An ultra-
orthodox private school system receives substantial state funds as well. See Englard,
supra note 62, at 201.
104. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 228.
105. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 228-29.
106. Section 2 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law,
5713-1953, 7 L.S.I. 139, states: "Marriages and divorces ofJews shall be performed
in Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law." See also Englard, supra note 62, at
202.
107. Englard, supra note 62, at 202. Non-recognized religious communities and
denominations lacking official standing may organize under private association rules.
Id. at 198.
108. Id. at 202.
109. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 243.
110. Englard, supra note 62, at 202. "The absence of civil marriage and the exclu-
siveness of religious law has grown in the eyes of the religious population into a
central symbol of the Jewishness of the State of Israel. Hence, its adamant attach-
Cornell International Law Journal
Israel's courts over the years have created "in various areas of family law
a civil system parallel to religious law."1 2 As a result, courts have occa-
sionally recognized marriages outside of the religious context.1 13
If the proposal's equal recognition of religious marriages and civil
marriages becomes part of an Israeli constitution, courts will no longer
need to resort to "disputable answers to weighty legal problems." 1 14
Clause 22(d)(2) allows religious marriage and divorce. 15 The proposal
does place one restriction on the freedom from religion: entering a reli-
gious marriage binds the partners, and they must "pursue a divorce
within the same religious authority."' 16 The orthodox religious estab-
lishment probably will "take profound umbrage" to this clause, 1 17
because it views the absence of civil marriage as "a central symbol of the
Jewishness of the State of Israel." ' 18
ment to the legal status quo." Id. The political argument in favor of the existing
system argues that change would endanger the Jewish people's unity. This argument
has succeeded "since national unity is a rational, if not utilitarian, objective on which
a large consensus exists among the parties." Id.
Ill. In H.C. 80/63, Garfinkel v. Minister of Interior, 17 P.D. 2048 (1963)
(Hebrew), a religious court held void as against public policy a private marriage
between a divorcee and a Cohen, a Jew who is a decendant of a high priest. Justice
Landau (majority) stated:
I see no reason for indignation at the conduct of the petitioners on account of
the stratagem which they used in arranging that 'private' marriage. Our State
assures all its citizens freedom of conscience. The petitioners do not observe
the commandments of religion, and by the law of the State they are free to do
SO.
Id. at 2069. Justice Silberg (minority) wrote:
This court sits not on Olympus but in the midst of its people. We are fully
aware of the struggle going on in Israel between the champions of religious
marriage and those of civil marriage, and we do not shut our eyes or close
our ears to the complaints of both camps against each other. But the prob-
lem is far too solemn, too delicate and too multifarious, and colorblind
Daltonists who see everything in 'black and white'-or in 'white and black'-
will never solve it.
Id. at 2060.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., C.A. 778/77, Farkash v. Farkash, 33(2) P.D. 460 (1979) (Hebrew)
(holding civil marriage conducted abroad valid on basis of public policy); C.A.
191/51, Skornik v. Skornik, 8 P.D. 141 (1954) (Hebrew) (holding Israel's recognition
of civil marriage conducted under Polish law required by international law).
114. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 58, at 242. See also Ettinger, The High Court ofJustice-A
Retreat for Captives of Marriage, 4 MISHPATiM 428 (1972) (Hebrew).
115. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 7.
116. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 7. The clause prevents the problem of marnzerut
(illegitimacy)-"a truly painful problem in Jewish law." Id. Mamzerut is an impedi-
ment to marriage in the Jewish religion. Since religious law does not recognize civil
divorce, it views a woman who is divorced civilly as still being married to her former
husband. The children she has with her new husband, therefore, are considered ille-
gitimate. Englard, supra note 62, at 203.
117. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 7.
118. Englard, supra note 62, at 202.
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3. Religious Communities in Homogeneous Neighborhoods
Section 22 (d) (4) of the proposed constitution allows religious communi-
ties living in homogeneous neighborhoods or settlements to create reg-
ulations to protect their way of life. 1 9 This provision would permit
local authorities to close streets near synagogues on the Sabbath or to
restrict traffic through religious neighborhoods on that day.' 20 How-
ever, the draft specifies that such restrictions must be done "on the basis
of equality" and must maintain a proper balance between the interests
of the religious community and those of the general public.121
The "equality" standard is highly ambiguous and the drafters prob-
ably expect the Supreme Court to shape and refine this formula in the
future. In interpreting this provision, Israeli courts will have to navigate
carefully between competing religious and secular interests. Some com-
mentators fear that this provision would allow the perpetuation of relig-
iously oppressive laws binding the secular Jewish community against its
beliefs. These commentators argue that "[t]here is hardly any oppres-
sive law in the State that does not stem from 'consideration for the inter-
ests of a religious public.' "122
4. Maintenance of Kashrut
Today, the Israeli Defense Army and government institutions observe
the kashrut ("ritual fitness") provisions concerning food. Section
22(d)(5) of the proposed constitution maintains this restriction despite
its religious origin. 123 Such protection benefits the community not only
for reasons of convenience or efficiency, 124 but also because observing
kashrut laws "forges a bond with the past of the Jewish people by means
of one of the most conspicuous of Jewish symbols."' 125
5. The "Independent Grounds "Justification
Subsection 22(d)(3) of the draft constitution offers another ambiguous
term in the effort to converge the conflicting ideologies concerning the
nature of law in a Jewish state. The proposal states that the principle of
freedom of religion and conscience does not affect provisions justifiable
"on independent grounds unconnected with religion."' 126 This stan-
dard attempts to distinguish between prohibited coercive religious legis-
lation and legislation which, although containing an ostensible religious
component, is justifiable on non-religious grounds. 1 2 7 Such a distinc-
119. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 7.
120. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 8.
121. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § C(22)(d)(4).
122. Michael, supra note 42.
123. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 22(d)(5). For ajustification of observ-
ing kashrut in the army, see Shetreet, supra note 60, at 217.
124. Requiring two kitchens in every army unit would be impractical since non-
religious soldiers can eat kosher food. Shetreet, supra note 60, at 217.
125. Shetreet, supra note 60, at 217.
126. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § C(22)(d)(3).
127. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 8.
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tion posits Judaism not merely as a religion or a theology, but as a
broader, national-cultural philosophy.128 Accordingly, "[l]egislation
that seeks to institutionalize non-specifically religious aspects ofJewish
life would not fall under the proscription of religious coercion. ' 129
The drafters expended great effort to create a principle under
which religion could be distanced, but not wholly separated, from the
state.' 3 0 They attempted to preserve the cultural-national heritage
"that is, after all, a raison d'etre of the Jewish state," without offending the
secular community. '31
Professor Bernard Susser offers specific examples to illustrate this
distinction. Suppose a party claimed that a law designating Saturday as
a day of rest represented religiously coercive legislation. A court inter-
preting the constitution would reject this claim because Sabbath rest is a
cultural phenomenon encompassing more than just the religious com-
ponent of Jewish society. 13 2 Likewise, a Ministry of Education decision
requiring the teaching of Passover songs and practices, even a model
seder, would not be unconstitutional. Passover has a national and cul-
tural significance reaching far beyond its religious meaning.13 3 On the
other hand, laws prohibiting public transportation or entertainment on
the Sabbath, or laws prohibiting the sale of pork generally, or of bread
during Passover, could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.' 3 4
In section C(22) ("Freedom of Religion and Conscience") the
Reichman Group draws a distinction between religious and national
norms, and leaves to the courts the task of defining practical limits in a
manner consistent with maximized freedom. 13 5 Despite opposition
from some religious groups, section C(22) may well represent "the most
hopeful and creative attempt.., to 'settle' the religion-state issue amica-
bly and in the national interest."' 3 6
A stronger statement of religious freedom than that contained in
section C(22), or total separation of religion and state on the American
model, probably is culturally and politically unfeasible in Israel. A less
ambiguous document is unlikely to withstand the religious parties'
objections. Ambiguity, however, does not undermine the section's
potential impact. Under the proposed framework, the drafters hope that
the Israeli judiciary will continue its historical pattern of protecting indi-
128. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 8.
129. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 8. Even the secular Jewish community follows
certain religious traditions which the law does not enforce, including circumcision,
The Passover seder, and not driving on Yom Kippur. See Reichman, supra note 45.
130. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 8-9; Interview with Rudolph Dolzer, supra note 12.
131. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 9.
132. B. Susser, supra note 98. See also Shetreet, supra note 60, at 210-11.
133. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 8.
134. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 8.
135. Interview with Bernard Susser, supra note 92; Interview with Rudolph Dolzer,
supra note 12.
136. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 10.
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vidual rights in matters of faith.13 7
M. The Political System in Israel: A Time for Reform
Most Israelis agree that their nation's political system is undergoing a
severe crisis. 13 8 History has made them pessimistic about their ability to
change Israel's public institutions. 139 Reform proposals are often lost in
the paths of history or in the halls of the Knesset.' 4 0 While many desire
change, only a few believe it is possible. At a time when Israelis are
losing faith in the democratic process, 141 the proposed constitution may
be viewed in part as an effort to restore that faith.
This Section describes Israel's current political system. It also iden-
tifies those areas in which reform is most needed. Finally, it analyzes the
proposed constitutional changes and the adequacy of these proposals
for political and governmental reform.
A. Elections and Parties: A Current View
Israel is one of the few states in the world maintaining a system of pure
proportional representation in a single national constituency.' 4 2 The
voters elect the Knesset by a proportional party-list system in which the
entire country forms one constituency.' 4 3 Three criticisms of the elec-
toral system are: "that in encouraging multipartisan and coalition rule it
impedes truly responsible government; that it facilitates undemocratic
choice of candidates; that it separates between electors and
representatives." 144
The State of Israel was founded on a multiparty system. In creating
a "regime of many parties," the proportional electoral system preserves
this formula.' 4 5 The result is political fragmentation and governmental
instability. Roughly fifteen parties compose the Knesset, almost half of
which are one- or two-member delegations. 146 The two large parties
are nearly equal in size, but they need the smaller parties in order to
form a governing majority. As a result, the party forming the ruling
137. See supra § II.C.
138. Suggestions, supra note 8, at 1.
139. Suggestions, supra note 8, at 1.
140. See Y. FREUDENHEIM, supra note 15.
141. Polls indicate that about 85 percent of Israeli citizens perceive a need for
change in government. Suggestions, supra note 8, at 175, 187; Reichman, supra note
45. About 71 percent of those questioned, however, view the public's ability to affect
politics as low. Suggestions, supra note 8; Susser, supra note 98.
142. Susser, Summary and Proposal, in Suggestions, supra note 8, at 214. European
countries that use such a system have moderated the "pernicious effects that this
system encourages by breaking the single national constituency into many districts,
introducing second rounds, providing for electoral thresholds that eliminate small
parties, and so on." B. Susser, supra note 98, at 10; Susser, Summary and Proposal, in
Suggestions, supra note 8, at 214.
143. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 45.
144. S. Sager, supra note 20, at 48.
145. S. Sager, supra note 20.
146. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 10.
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coalition must often concede to the smaller parties' extravagant
demands in order to reach a coalition agreement. 14 7 These sectarian
demands often threaten government stability, and contribute to the
opinion that "there is only a weak correspondence between balloting
results and the kind of Government which takes office."' 148 The desire
to eliminate small political groups and to induce mergers has spurred
repeated proposals to raise the one percent of votes which parties must
currently win to receive Knesset seats.14 9 The drafters implement this
suggestion, discussed in section IV.C below.
A second problem is that the current electoral system facilitates an
undemocratic choice of candidates by allowing political parties autono-
mously to establish internal nomination procedures.150 No law requires
parties to conduct internal elections, 15 1 and criticism has surrounded
some parties' practices. 152 Most commonly, the party leadership assigns
to a nomination committee the task of preparing a list of candidates.
The committee reports its decision to the party's central committee,
which then may change particular candidates or the list order. 153 Even
the more democratic method, allowing the party's region to choose a
proportion of the candidates, leaves the final ordering of the list to the
nominations and central committees. 154 It is thus unclear to what
extent parties reflect the views of the population which they purport to
represent. 155
Battles between different factions hinder many parties in reaching
their goals. 15 6 A lust for power replaces the solidarity and the shared
pursuit of ideals.' 5 7 The parties direct their financial and human
resources toward seizing power and achieving personal and factional
interests. In the process, members ignore issues they ought to con-
front. 158 The democratic principle that the party should serve as a link
between the electorate and the executive, and work to fulfill the public's
wishes, fails. 15 9
147. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 11.
148. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 50.
149. For a brief discussion of these proposals, see S. SAGER, supra note 20.
150. Goldberg & Brazeli, The Weaknesses of the Political System in Israel, in Sugges-
tions, supra note 8, at 7 (Hebrew).
151. Goldberg & Brazeli supra note 150, at 7. The drafters' proposal includes sec-
tions ensuring inner party democracy. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 0
(Political Parties).
152. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 50.
153. S. Sager, supra note 20, at 50. The Democratic Party for Change deviated
from this pattern in the 1977 elections by using a rank-and-file membership to deter-
mine the candidate list. Id. at 50.
154. S. Sager, supra note 20, at 50.
155. Goldberg & Brazeli, supra note 150, at 7.
156. Goldberg & Brazeli, supra note 150, at 8.
157. Goldberg & Brazeli, supra note 150, at 8.
158. Goldberg & Brazeli, supra note 150, at 8.
159. Goldberg & Brazeli, supra note 150, at 8. "Similar phenomena occur in other
democracies, but in Israel they have an especially severe effect because of characteris-
tics specific to Israeli democracy." Id.
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Officials who are elected through a candidates list fixed by the cen-
tral party organization may often feel a greater allegiance to the party
than to "amorphous electoral constituents." 160 Elected officials lack a
sense of responsibility toward the voters, and "[v]oters, for their part,
regularly complain [in opinion polls] that they lack any direct tie to their
elected representatives." 1 61 This system places the central party organi-
zation beyond voter control. 162 It promotes and rewards the "sectarian,
loyal and unimaginative functionary, rather than independent, dynamic,
innovative personalities."' 163
The Israeli electoral system produces a passive, apathetic public
that has lost faith in the democratic process. 164 Rising impatience with
the electoral system, lack of agreement on basic political-societal issues,
and a static constitutional scheme' 65 combine to demand broad reform.
B. National Elections: A Proposed Constitutional Format
Professor Susser offers five goals for reform in the electoral system.
Reform should: (1) protect the heterogeneity and the mainstreams
existing in Israeli politics (a new electoral system should not leave the
Arabs or the OrthodoxJews without representation); (2) increase stabil-
ity and efficiency of the system; (3) reduce the ability of small parties
necessary to form a coalition from presenting extreme demands con-
trary to public opinion; (4) reduce the centrality, irresponsiveness, and
dominance of the political parties and encourage growth of creative
leaders; (5) create direct ties between the citizen and its representatives,
enabling the citizen to "punish" elected officials who fail. 166 The draft-
ers of the proposed constitution seek to attain these goals through a new
mixed proportional-direct electoral system.
1. A Dual Vote System
In section E-"The Knesset," the proposed constitution suggests a
reformed electoral mechanism based on the West German system. 16 7
The proposal mixes both proportional and direct systems by giving each
voter two votes: a national vote for the party, and a regional vote for a
160. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 53.
161. Susser, supra note 98, at 11.
162. Susser, supra note 98, at 11.
163. Susser, supra note 98, at 11.
164. Interview with Uriel Reichman, supra note 10. See also supra note 141. The
fact that over 80 percent of the electorate voted in the last election may indicate a
desire for change.
165. The Israeli constitutional scheme has not undergone major changes. The
only significant structural reform was the 1975 change in the local election laws.
Goldberg & Brazeli, supra note 150, at 13. This inertia stems both from the demo-
cratic nature of the state and from a lack of public recognition of constitutional
defects. Id. at 14.
166. See Susser, supra note 142, at 215.
167. Bracha, supra note 99. For a comparison between the electoral systems of
West Germany and Israel, see Newberg, Strengthening the Democracy in West Germany,-
Lessons for the State of Israel, in Suggestions, supra note 8.
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regional candidate. One half (sixty) of the Knesset seats would be
apportioned according to the results in the district elections in the sixty
election constituencies; the other half according to proportional
national elections.16 8 The national vote would decide the proportion of
seats each party would receive. The regional vote would determine who
is to occupy those seats. 169
The proposal adds a direct link between the voters and half of the
120 Knesset members.' 7 0 In apportioning the seats according to the
national vote, the proposal retains the current system's national
focus.1 7 1 Voters could split their votes. They could vote for a party in
the national vote and use the regional vote to elect an attractive candi-
date from the opposing party. 172
Such a strategy would not weaken the party supported by the voter
in the national vote. The draft constitution's "split vote" option would
divorce the outcome of regional elections from the balance of Knesset
seats, and thereby avoid "the severe problems involved in demarcation
of election districts that confront most direct-regional systems .... ,,173
As proposed, each party is to compile a list of candidates and order it
based on democratic elections. 174 The Knesset members representing
each party "shall be determined in the order of the national list, in omis-
168. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § E(51). The following provisions
would govern district elections:
(a) A candidate in an election constituency shall be resident in that constitu-
ency and belong to a party which is contesting the elections on a national
basis.
(b) Candidacy in an election constituency shall be submitted by residents of
that constituency under a democratic process as shall be prescribed by
Law... [R]esidents who hold the right to vote may vote in constituency
elections.
(c) The winner in a constituency shall be the candidate, out of the candi-
dates whose party attained the cut-off quota in the nationwide elections as
provided in section 53(c), who received the highest number of the votes cast
in that constituency.
(d) A Permanent Committee on constituency elections, which shall be com-
posed and function as prescribed by Law and the majority of whose members
shall be judges, shall delimit the constituencies and be empowered to change
them. The area of a constituency shall be of unbroken contiguity, and the
number of voters in each constituency shall be the same so far as may be.
Id. at § E(52).
169. Goldberg & Brazeli, supra note 150, at 12. This is one respect in which the
Israeli proposal differs from the West German system. See supra note 167.
170. This allocation of half the seats by a national vote and half by regional vote
balances both national and local interests. Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 14, at 70.
171. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 13. This proportional character retains Israel's
three main societal cleavages: between hawks and doves, between religious tradition-
alists and secularists, and between Jews and Arabs.
172. See Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § E(53).
173. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 13.
174. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § E(53)(a). Section 0 includes provi-
sions ensuring democratic processes within the party. Section 57 bars a party from
Knesset elections if the Supreme Court holds that its objects or activities "entail any
of the following: (1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the State of the
Jewish People; (2) negation of the democratic character of the State; (3) incitement to
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sion of the names of the candidates elected in the constituencies." 175 If
a party wins more seats than the number of Knesset seats it received
proportionate to the number of national votes, all candidates elected in
the constituencies will represent it. The number of Knesset members
will increase by the difference "and no further proportional calculation
shall be made among the parties."' 76
2. The 2.5 Percent Representation Requirement
Section E(53)(c), which effectively eliminates small party representation,
is a crucial part of the electoral reform scheme. The proposal would
disqualify parties failing to receive at least 2.5 percent of the votes 177
and it provides that "the votes cast in [these parties'] behalf shall not be
included" in the vote count.1 7 8 As a result, the number of parties would
likely drop from fifteen to roughly seven, leaving Labor Alignment, a
large left-of-center party; Likud, a large right-of-center party; a smaller
party to the right of Likud (today's T'chiya); and one smaller party to the
left of Labor (encompassing Ratz, Mapam, and possibly Shinui).179 The
new system also would guarantee an Arab party and probably two reli-
gious parties.
Raising the threshold percentage to 2.5 percent has many advan-
tages.18 0 Reducing the number of parties will increase the stability of
the ruling coalition previously dependent on marginal parties. Small
parties will no longer be able to demand outrageous sectarian com-
promises by the government. The proposal allows the Prime Minister
more independence and greater leverage as fewer conflicting ideologies
contend for the political spotlight. The new disqualifying percentage
will ease the Prime Minister's duties when forming a coalition and run-
ning the government.' 8 ' Reducing representational fragmentation also
would enable the government to plan consistent short and long-term
policies.
racism." Likewise, § 190(b) establishes these three conditions as an exception to
§ 190(a)'s guarantee that "Everyone may found and maintain a party."
Some express concern that this would remove "outside-the-law" parties, such as
Rakkah (created in 1965 as the New Communist List, quickly becoming identified as
an Arab nationalist or liberation movement), D. PERETZ, supra note 87, at 102, or
parties proclaiming Israeli ownership by the Druz, for example. Michael, supra note
42. Reichman responds that Israel's democratic nature will prevent such discrimina-
tion. Reichman, supra note 45.
175. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § E(53)(b).
176. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § E(53)(d).
177. The system currently requires one percent representation.
178. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § E(53)(c). When a Knesset member
introduced a 2.5 percent threshold requirement in 1981, the bill received strong sup-
port but was narrowly defeated by a vote of 44 to 37. See S. SAGER, supra note 20, at
50.
179. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 14.
180. For a further discussion of these advantages, see Susser, supra note 142, at
215-16.
181. See Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 14, at 71.
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Some argue that reducing the number of parties will harm democ-
racy by eliminating certain groups, and will force supporters of ousted
parties to take action outside of the parliamentary forum.' 8 2 Such con-
cerns overlook the equally plausible outcome that the disqualified par-
ties will either unite or join the larger parties.18 3 Moreover, the 2.5
percent requirement still guarantees representation of the Arab party
and one or two religious parties.18 4
The proposed electoral system is only part of the effort to remedy
the malfunctioning political system. The drafters also suggest far-reach-
ing revisions in the political balance of powers. The following section
describes the current system and analyzes proposed changes.
C. The Knesset, the Government and the Executive: The Current
Balance of Powers
The Israeli Knesset is the 120-member body that sustains the govern-
ment, oversees governmental activities, and legislates.' 8 5 The Knesset
enjoys constitutional supremacy; a simple majority suffices to pass most
legislation.' 8 6 The government is responsible to the Knesset and is
dependent on Knesset approval.' 8 7 Government composition com-
monly follows inter-party negotiations, often resulting in a government
comprised of ministers whom the Prime Minister dislikes. This situation
increases disagreement and weakens the government, leaving it suscep-
tible to blackmail by various political groups.
Parliamentary groups of at least two members may bring a motion
of no-confidence in the government.1 88 "Basic Law: The Government"
states that "[t]he Government holds office by virtue of the confidence of
182. See Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 14, at 70.
183. Such realignments have occurred in Israel before. Lehman-Wilzig, supra note
14, at 70.
184. The drafters rejected West Germany's model, deeming that country's five
percent requirement as too high. The drafters sought to retain the representation of
important sectors of Israeli society, such as the Arab sector. Interview with Bernard
Susser, supra note 92.
185. S. Sager, supra note 20, at 145. Statutes prescribe the Knesset's elective
duties-e.g., internal duties in choosing presidium and committee membership. The
Knesset also "exercises quasi-judicial functions as the final arbiter of its own compo-
sition and of the status of members." Id. at 160-61.
186. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 110.
187. Basic Law: The Government, supra note 34, specifies procedures for choosing
a government. The President assigns the task to a Knesset member who is likely to
form a coalition and become Prime Minister. If that member fails, the President may
assign the task to another. If the latter fails, parliamentary groups comprising a
majority can recommend a person who shall be the "cabinet maker." S. SAGER, supra
note 20, at 196.
188. Interview with Bernard Susser, supra note 92. The Knesset's own enactment
is the only way to shorten a Knesset term. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 195. Under the
current system, when a no-confidence motion is made, the next Knesset meeting
must review it as the first item on the agenda. Id. at 197. Parties can use this practice
to threaten a government with a precarious majority, forcing it to call its supporters
to vote. Id.; Interview with Bernard Susser, supra note 92.
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the Knesset."' 8 9 Under this framework, "[t]he Knesset can express its
non-confidence in the Government, and if it makes use of this authority
then 'the Government shall be deemed to have resigned on the day of
the expression of non-confidence.' "190 Thus, if the government fails to
retain a majority in the Knesset, it will be unable to fulfill its functions
and the Knesset could overthrow it.191
Opposition groups occasionally use this extreme tactic to force dis-
cussion of issues for which no other procedure is available. 192 No-confi-
dence motions also can serve as a dilatory device. 193 Since the same
majority (fifty-one percent) needed to pass legislation also can topple
the government, the system creates instability by allowing sectarian fac-
tions to pressure the government to compromise. Under the present
framework, a small coalition party can threaten to withdraw its support
unless the government meets its demands, leaving the government with
only two choices: to concede or to fall. 194 Most often, the government
capitulates. 1 9 5 A new system that provides the government the political
resources to withstand such demands is necessary. The proposed con-
stitution offers a potential solution.
D. "Parlidential" Rule: A Proposed Constitutional Format
The drafters of the proposed constitution strongly disagreed about the
type of political reform which would best suit the Israeli political cli-
mate. 196 The various proposals for reform, however, generally agreed
that there was a pressing need to strengthen the executive against the
forces which weaken it.'1 7 In order to avoid total breakdown of the con-
stitutional project, the drafters agreed to a "parlidential" system of gov-
ernment, a unique creation whose novelty certainly merits scholarly
attention. 198
189. Basic Law: The Government, supra note 34.
190. G. YAAcoBI, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL 48 (1982)(Hebrew).
191. d
192. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 198.
193. S. SAGER, supra note 20, at 198.
194. Susser, Jerusalem Post, Aug. 28, 1987.
195. Interview with Bernard Susser, supra note 92.
196. The group split into two factions. One, including Professor Reichman, sup-
ported presidential politics, fearing the lack of leadership in Israeli politics and
potential harm to democracy. The second group feared that a presidential system
would enable a strongman to take control of the Knesset. This group also feared a
situation in which the Prime Minister belonged to one party, while another party
controlled the legislature. A hostile Knesset would result in deadlock. Interview with
Bernard Susser, supra note 92.
197. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 14. The United States is the only Western state
with a presidential system that has a strong democracy. Some facially democratic
countries, such as the Philippines or Korea, also have such governments. Interview
with Bernard Susser, supra note 92.
198. A "parlidential" structure is an unlikely prospect since most theorists believe
that parliamentary and presidential systems are based on mutually exclusive princi-
pIes. Professor Susser explains:
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1. Presidential Elements
The proposed constitution stipulates in section H-"The Government,"
that "general, nationwide, direct, secret and equal" balloting would
elect the Prime Minister.' 9 9 In a first election round, the candidate
receiving forty-five percent of the votes would be Prime Minister.2 0 0
The Knesset could remove the Prime Minister by a no-confidence reso-
lution which requires passage by a vote of at least sixty percent plus one
of the Knesset Members. 20 ' This would result in elections for a new
Prime Minister and a new Knesset. 20 2 The ingeniousness of the pro-
posed structure lies in its maneuvering between the forty percent (48
members) the government needs to survive and the fifty-one percent it
requires to pass legislation. 20 3
Presidential systems rest on the direct election of the executive, its autonomy
from the legislature, on a fixed term of office and so on. Parliamentary sys-
tems, by contrast, are founded on the executive's appointment out of the
ranks of the legislature, its dependence on legislative support for its survival
and on terms of office that are vulnerable to legislative determination....
Most obvious of these incongruities is the impossibility of mixing a system
that elects the chief executive officer by popular vote with one in which his
tenure rests on the confidence of the legislature.... A chief executive officer
elected-even by a landslide vote-but nevertheless immediately removable
by a hostile majority in the legislature, is an unmitigated political nightmare.
B. Susser, supra note 98, at 16.
The drafters studied the constitution of the Fifth Republic of France, which inte-
grated presidential and parliamentary elements. In France, the parliamentary and
the presidential executives coexist. Since the president is not responsible to the leg-
islature, however, the structure prevents a total mix of systems. The drafters rejected
this arrangement mainly because of its tendency towards "pendular swings between
,monarchial' politics-when the president controls a majority in the National Assem-
bly-and the tension-laden paralysis of 'cohabitation' when the president faces a hos-
tile legislative majority." B. Susser, supra note 98, at 17. For a discussion of the
French political system and additional reasons for its inapplicability to Israel, see
Greylsmer, The Political System in France and the Israeli Political Reality: Similarities and
Differences, in Suggestions supra note 8, at 80.
199. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § H(1 15)(a). The President will con-
tinue to be the ceremonial head of state. Id. at § D. The Knesset may remove the
President from office by a two-thirds vote. Id. at § 45(a).
200. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 115(b). If no candidate receives 45
percent, a second round of elections "shall be held between the two candidates who
received the most votes in the first round. In the second round, the candidate receiv-
ing the majority of the vote will be elected Prime Minister." Id. at § 115(c). Direct
elections would determine the Deputy Prime Minister as well. Id. at § 117. Today,
no party would receive 45 percent of the total vote because small parties would offer
candidates for the Prime Minister position both to show that they are a national party
and to represent their sectarian needs in a coalition. Interview with Bernard Susser,
supra note 92.
201. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 122(a). Israeli history demonstrates
that a Prime Minister is likely to carry out his entire term because of the difficulty in
forming a 73-member majority. The system, nevertheless, would guard against
abuses of power. Interview with Bernard Susser, supra note 92; B. Susser, supra note
98, at 17.
202. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 122(b).
203. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 18; Bracha, supra note 99.
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The proposal does not eliminate the Prime Minister's need to form
a coalition government among the approximately seven remaining par-
ties. The Prime Minister still needs fifty-one percent of the coalition in
order to pass legislation. 20 4 If adopted, however, the constitution
would enable a government failing to achieve the fifty-one percent nec-
essary to pass legislation to survive as long as it maintained the forty
percent needed to block a hostile majority.20 5 A reduction in parlia-
mentary support below the fifty percent mark would not cause the dead-
lock normally resulting under presidential politics. 20 6 Each legislative
vote would no longer be a potential vote of confidence.
Another presidential element of the proposed parlidential system
relates to the appointment of ministers. The Prime Minister appoints
his ministers. 20 7 The proposed constitution provides that within 30
days of a minister's assuming office, a vote of three-fifths of the Knesset
can nullify the appointment. 208 The proposal further notes that "[t]he
Prime Minister and his Deputy, Ministers, and Council Chairmen shall
not be Knesset Members." '20 9
There are two important ramifications to such an arrangement.
First, it would "open the Knesset to a great deal of 'new blood' ",210 and
increase professionalism. Second, it would make the "prospect of being
fired by the Prime Minister a truly daunting one-after all, there would
be no Knesset seat to which one could safely return. Dismissal would
mean 'political exile'."'2 11
2. Parliamentary Elements
The constitution includes certain parliamentary provisions as well. If
the Prime Minister and his deputy resign simultaneously, the Knesset
disperses and new elections for both the executive and the legislature
follow. 2 12 Section 110 of the constitution defines the "Executive" as the
entire government, not as the chief executive alone.2 13 Under this
scheme, the government would reach decisions through a determination
204. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 18.
205. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 18. The government would survive even if it had
to set aside its legislative plans temporarily. Interview with Bernard Susser, supra
note 92.
206. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 19.
207. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 128(a).
208. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 128(d).
209. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 134(a). Section 134(b) adds that they
may not "engage in any activity calculated to produce any profit, income or remuner-
ation." The problem of "double duties" is common in Israel, and it affects the effi-
ciency and quality of government. Knesset members' attendance at Knesset
discussions is often irregular, as they struggle to divide their time between several
public positions. The drafters of the proposed constitution believe that "Knesset
membership, however, is a 'full-time job' and should so be treated." Susser, supra
note 142, at 241.
210. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 20.
211. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 20.
212. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 127(c).
213. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 110.
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of the ministerial majority. The Prime Minister, with only one vote,
must labor within this constraint to build a majority.2 1 4
Some express fear concerning the possibility of a "strongman" with
non-democratic tendencies taking power in a system of direct elec-
tions. 2 15 Reichman responds that critics should view the constitution as
one unit, rather than focus on one section as distinct from the others. 2 16
The constitution rests on the notion that "the State exists for the benefit
of its citizens, and that there is a limit to the ability of the political system
to govern the citizens' lives. '2 1 7 The proposal, however, creates a sys-
tem of checks that should prevent a strongman from seizing power.2 18
These checks include: (1) the Prime Minister's inability to make deci-
sions without governmental support; (2) the sixty percent vote of confi-
dence procedure; (3) the multi-party system, which necessitates
coalition-building and works to review the Prime Minister's actions; and
(4) the Supreme Court, the Knesset, and the government all monitoring
and checking the Prime Minister.2 19
In combining elements that typically do not coexist, the parlidential
model may appear somewhat inelegant when compared to traditional
systems of government.2 20 Paradoxically, the system suits the Israeli cli-
mate in the political and institutional sense.2 2 1 It offers the stability of a
presidential system while safeguarding against the possibility of a
strongman taking over. In synthesizing the best features of each polit-
ical system, the proposal circumvents those scenarios which often result
in deadlock and chaos.
E. The 1988 Elections: A Case in Point
The latest elections, held on November 1, 1988, illustrate the danger
and imbalance inherent in the current electoral system. Sixteen new
parties competed in the general elections. Most of them were "dark
horses", unlikely to receive the 24,000 votes needed to win a single
Knesset seat.22 2 These parties, however, still have a profound effect on
214. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 21.
215. See, e.g., And If The Prime Minister Goes Crazy, Chadashot, Aug. 14, 1987
(Hebrew).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. In creating this system, the drafters engaged in hypotheticals and simulation
games. They examined the model's operation under a Prime Minister with totalitar-
ian tendencies, under one that lacks leadership, under one that lacks majority repre-
sentation in the Knesset, and under a Prime Minister confronted with emergency
situations. Professor Reichman admits that there is still room to question the ade-
quacy of the proposal for Israeli politics. See id.
219. Interview with Bernard Susser, supra note 92.
220. For example, if the Prime Minister is directly and popularly elected, why allow
a Knesset vote to dismiss him or her? Likewise, why not allow the Prime Minister to
make decisions without the Knesset if the Prime Minister appoints the Ministers him-
self? B. Susser, supra note 98, at 21.
221. B. Susser, supra note 98, at 21.
222. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1988, at A8, col. 1.
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the election results. In 1984, nearly 59,000 Israelis divided their votes
among eleven parties that failed to win any seats.2 23 These votes, dis-
tributed among the larger parties, could have saved the country from
the election deadlock resulting in the "national unity" government. 224
The presence of so many small parties once again defined the elec-
tion outcome. The Likud and Labor parties won 39 seats and 38 seats
respectively, 225 enabling neither party to form a government without
the religious parties' participation. These parties, which received a com-
bined total of 18 seats, hold the balance of power. The Orthodox block,
enjoying its increased popularity, is pursuing its favorite religious issues,
including legislation of Sabbath observance and changing the national
definition of who is ajew to exclude Reform and Conservative converts.
Rabbi Peretz, of Shas, demonstrating the sort of harsh dealing typical of
Israeli politics, said that he would be willing to join a Likud government
depending "on the degree to which Likud will march to our
demands." 2 26
Many Israelis are shocked to discover the power the religious par-
ties now wield, 22 7 and are fearful of a future filled with Orthodox restric-
tions and interference. Under the proposed constitutional scheme, one
of the two major parties might have been able to receive the majority
needed to form a government. Even if not, some of the smaller Ortho-
dox and right wing parties would not have received enough votes to
enable them to force the leading party into compromises which do not
command the support of the majority of the population. Once again,
the Israeli democratic process has failed many of its citizens, highlight-
ing the need for a change in the electoral system.
IV. A Constitution-Now?
The sense of disappointment and waning idealism engulfing Israeli soci-
ety has led many to believe that the country is ready to renew discus-
sions on the constitutional issue.2 28 The feeling of instability and loss of
control is particularly strong following the November elections and the
events of the Palestinian uprising, which highlight the need for restruc-
turing and new hope. Even if the proposal fails, the effort has brought
223. Id.
224. Most Israelis viewed this government, made of the Likud and Labor parties, as
a terrible experience, not to be repeated. See, e.g., id. (discussing "disastrous Labor-
Likud national unity Government' "); N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1988, at A14, col. 4 ("the
public has lost confidence in [the two major parties] after the last four years of gov-
erning together").
225. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at A14, col. 6.
226. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
227. Four Orthodox parties won a combined 18 seats, 50 percent more than in the
1984 elections.
228. Shtrasman, A Constitution Now, Maariv, Aug. 16, 1987 (Hebrew); Zamir, About
the Proposed Constitution, Yediot Acharonot, Aug. 28, 1987 (Hebrew); Reichman, Now is
the Time for a Constitution, Yediot Acharonot, Sept. 17, 1987 (Hebrew); Weiss, A Recom-
mendation for Parlidential Rule, Davar, Aug. 24, 1987 (Hebrew).
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the issue to the public's attention and it has prepared the ground for
additional efforts in the future.
Israel has much to gain from a constitution. Current Israeli law is a
combination of laws from many sources: British mandatory law, and
Ottoman, American, and Jewish laws. The historical development of
these sources is dissimilar, and the combination of their basic principles
in the Israeli legal framework on occasion leads to unnatural and unsat-
isfactory results. 22 9 A written constitution would provide a single, uni-
fied legal system suited to the particular needs of the Israeli state.
A constitution also would guarantee individual rights to Israel's citi-
zens, including religious and ethnic minorities, as well as the secular
majority. Recent polls indicate that about thirty percent of Israelis are
willing to deviate from democratic principles.2 30 The importance of a
bill of rights and a constitution in such a climate hardly can be
disputed.2 3 1
The constitution offers a system of judicial review, an additional
protection of individual rights and civil liberties.2 32 The judiciary may
strike down any legislation repugnant to the constitution:233 "Such pro-
tection is particularly important in a system of governance that does not
include a separation of powers or a system of checks and balances
between the judiciary and the executive, a system in which it is easy to
gather a majority, but difficult to control it." '2 3 4
Finally, some believe that the absence of an Israeli constitution indi-
cates the absence of a social agreement.2 35 Accepting this deficiency
constitutes a desertion of fundamental political and democratic princi-
ples. Israeli society cannot afford to lose faith in democracy, and it can-
not survive in the face of the conflicts and the compromises of Israeli
politics.
Commentators opposing the proposal offer convincing reasons, as
well. Some say that the same reasons that postponed the drafting of a
constitution in 1949, and which led to the Harari Resolution, 23 6 still are
relevant today;2 37 the same cultural pluralism exists, as does Israel's
political and military isolation. Courts have developed a method of
operating within the existing system and they have created a balance of
229. Susser, supra note 142, at 255.
230. See Reichman, supra note 45.
231. In addition to protecting individual liberty, a bill of rights would serve an
important educational function. Zamir, Freedom Without a Constitution, Ha'aretz, Oct.
16, 1987 (Hebrew).
232. Susser, supra note 142, at 255.
233. Proposed Constitution, supra note 4, § 206(a).
234. Susser, supra note 142, at 255.
235. Susser, supra note 142, at 255.
236. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
237. Constitution Now?, Halishka, Jan. 12, 1987, at 10 (Hebrew). Professor Ruth
Gavison, a civil rights activist, argues that Israel was far more democratic forty years
ago, that a constitution is therefore just as inappropriate now as it was then, and that
a referendum would not increase the protection of individual rights. Id.
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sorts. A constitution would not bring a consensus, they argue, but
would "tear the thin and fragile embroidery that has formed over the
years." 23 8
The bill of rights, which most believe to be a necessary addition,
therefore will prompt objections. Disagreement will arise concerning
questions of freedom of religion, nationality, and culture.2 39 The courts
have developed a system of circumventing the mandatory and emer-
gency laws, interpreting them with a view toward human rights. Oppo-
nents are concerned that a bill of rights legitimating the current
legislation will strengthen the sectors seeking to retain these laws in
force. 24 0
Another argument opponents of the proposal advance is that the
draft is an unnecessary revolution that ignores the presence of the nine
Basic Laws.2 4 1 They encourage the Knesset to direct its constitutional
efforts toward completing the Basic Laws on human rights and
legislation. 24 2
Amidst academic and political discussions concerning the propo-
sal's ability to change the face of Israeli life stands the question of
whether the Israeli people are ready to embrace these notions.24 3 Many
claim that a constitution only can reflect existing conditions, but cannot
manufacture political realities. 2 44 A constitution can articulate basic
principles, but "[i]n the end, the defence of the people's rights depends
on their will to defend them." 24 5
The drafters of the proposed constitution hope to shatter the "cruel
magic circle of public apathy and political hesitation" paralyzing the
Israeli citizenry.2 4 6 Presenting yet another plan of political reform
before a disappointed, cynical public will not achieve these ends. In
contrast, introducing a tangible and dramatic document-a constitu-
238. Susser, supra note 142, at 258.
239. Susser, supra note 142, at 258.
240. Gavison, The Controversy over Israel's Bill ofRights, 15 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTs.
113, 131 n.51 (1985).
241. Beder, Constitution and the Basic Laws, Maariv, Sept. 30, 1987 (Hebrew).
242. For Professor Reichman's response, see Reichman, And Nevertheless, A Constitu-
tion Now, Ha'aretz, Oct. 23, 1987 (Hebrew).
243. On whether the constitutional effort should or should not be an intellectual,
rather than a legal-theoretical, endeavor, see Reichman, supra note 242; Susser, supra
note 142, at 256.
244. Susser, supra note 142, at 258. Constitutions occasionally succeed in rear-
ranging institutions, but installing order amidst the uncertainty of a multi-cultural,
religiously pluralistic society might be beyond the capabilities of a written document.
245. Friedler, Oxford Professor Cautions Pro-Constitutional Israelis, Jerusalem Post, Jan.
14, 1988, at 4 (quoting Professor Vernon Bogdanor). Additionally,
[t]he protection of human rights and liberties depends upon the will of the
people that they should be respected. I do not believe that a written constitu-
tion setting out formally the human rights to be protected gives any more
practical force to their protection than the will of the people shown through
the Knesset and exemplified by the courts in the interpretation of the law.
Diplock, supra note 1, at 463.
246. Susser, supra note 142, at 257.
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tion-may excite the Israeli imagination and overcome the current
destructive inertia. 247
Marina 0. Lowy
247. Susser, supra note 142, at 257.
